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CLEAN WATER ACT
Charting the Turbulent Waters of Federalism:
Striking the Proper Balance Under the Clean Water Act
by William L. Andreen
PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County and the City of Tacoma
V.
State of Washington, Department of Ecology,
Department of Fisheries, and Department of Wildlife
(Docket No. 92-1911)
Argument Date: February 23, 1994
From: Supreme Court of Washington
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act to restore and main-
tain the chemical, biological, and physical integrity of the
nation's rivers and lakes. To accom-
plish that ambitious objective,
Congress created a comprehensive Case ai
regulatory structure that relies on a
complicated partnership between fed- rior to the
eral and state agencies. emment h
That regulatory structure sets forth I over the li
two basic mechanisms to combat tric facilities. Con
water pollution. The first is aimed at nized the import
the control of "point source" dis- play in controllin
charges - pipes and other dis- vested them with
cernible conveyances through which and even veto f
pollutants are added to water. Such licenses on the ba
discharges are forbidden in the ty standards. Th
absence of a permit issued by the scope of this authc
United States Environmental entific and techni
Protection Agency or by an approved with state water
state program. These permits contain does it also includ
enforceable obligations based pri- eficial water uses
marily on federally-established regu-
lations which define minimum, tech-
nology-based effluent limitations.
Congress, however, also retained a system of state water-
quality standards to supplement the new technology-driven
approach. Permits for point source discharges, thus, must
reflect whatever more stringent requirements are necessary to
achieve compliance with state water-quality objectives.
Unlike the uniform, technology-based effluent limitations,
state water-quality standards are tailored to the uses and val-
ues of specific streams and other waterways. State water-
William L. Andreen is the Edgar L. Clarkson Professor of
Law at the University of Alabama School of Law, Box
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quality standards, therefore, incorporate 1) designated uses
for the waters involved, e.g., fish survival and propagation or
public drinking-water supplies, and 2) scientific and technical
criteria designed to protect those uses.
The second regulatory approach, found in the Clean Water
Act, is aimed at "non-point source" discharges of pollution -
problems generally associated with certain land-use activities,
like farming, or with activities that otherwise alter the aquatic
environment, like dams. State programs which deal with non-
point source pollution generally specify appropriate manage-
ment practices, called "best management practices" in the
Clean Water Act, intended to restore and maintain compli-
ance with water-quality standards.
In the regulation of both point
source and non-point source dis-
Glance charges, state water-quality stan-
dards play a significant role. The sig-
Os, the federal gov- nificance of these state standards is
exclusive authority further enhanced by Section 401 of
sing of hydroelec- the Clean Water Act. This provision
ss, however, recog- requires applicants for federal licens-
role states could es or permits whose activities may
rater pollution and cause discharge into waters of the
authority to review United States, including applicants
ral hydroelectric seeking a license for a hydroelectric
)f state water-quali- project, to obtain a certificate from
case explores the the affected state. State certification
: Is it limited to sci- means that any resulting discharge
criteria associated will comply with state water-quality
ality standards or standards, as well as with other perti-
e protection of ben- nent requirements of the Clean
h as fish habitat? Water Act. Consequently, state certi-
fication must contain whatever limi-
tations are necessary to ensure com-
pliance with applicable Clean Water Act requirements and
any other appropriate requirements of state law. In the
absence of a Section 401 certificate, no federal license or per-
mit may be issued.
ISSUES
All parties agree that this case presents the following ques-
tion: Did the State of Washington exceed its authority under
federal law by imposing minimum stream flow requirements
as a condition to water-quality certification under Section 401
of the Clean Water Act for a proposed hydroelectric facility
subject to Federal Power Act licensing requirements? The
Petitioners, the City of Tacoma and Public Utility District No.

















I of Jefferson County, also contend that the Supreme Court
should decide whether the Federal Power Act grants the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission the exclusive author-
ity, unaffected by Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, to
determine such minimum stream flows.
FACTS
The Dosewallips River is a pristine and undeveloped
stream that drains a large portion of the Olympic Peninsula in
western Washington. The river runs east through the Olympic
National Park, a national wilderness area, a national forest,
and private land prior to flowing into the western reaches of
Puget Sound. The Dosewallips supports three species of
fish- steelhead trout as well as Chinook and Coho salmon.
In March 1986, the City of Tacoma and the Jefferson
County Public Utility District No. I ("PUD") filed an applica-
tion with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (the
"FERC") to build the Elkhorn Hydroelectric Project (the
"Elkhorn Project") on the Dosewallips River. This facility
would involve building a diversion weir, a small dam, just
outside the Olympic National Park. The weir would divert
water from a 1.2 mile stretch of the river - the bypass stretch.
The diverted water would flow through a nine-foot diame-
ter tunnel, called a penstock, at a relatively constant elevation,
whereas the natural river falls rather steeply. After running
parallel to the river for 1.2 miles, the penstock would drop
almost vertically through two hydroelectric turbines, rated at
a total of 13.3 megawatts, after which the water would be
returned to the river through a channel, called a tailrace.
Since a Section 401 certificate under the Clean Water Act
was a precondition to FERC licensing action for the Elkhorn
Project, Tacoma and PUD applied for state water-quality cer-
tification in 1983. As part of the certification process, Tacoma
and PUD, in cooperation with a number of federal and state
agencies, embarked on a two-year study to examine the effect
of the Elkhorn Project on fish in the bypass reach of the
Dosewallips.
At the conclusion of the study, Tacoma and PUD proposed
to maintain a minimum flow of water in the Dosewallips River
("minimum stream flow") of between 65 cubic feet per second
and 155 cubic feet per second ("cfs"), depending on the month.
(The natural flow in that stretch of River ranges between 149
cfs and 738 cfs.) In June 1986, the Washington State
Department of Ecology issued a Section 401 certificate requir-
ing minimum stream flows of between 100 cfs and 200 cfs.
Dissatisfied with the state's approach, Tacoma and PUD
appealed to the Washington Pollution Control Hearings
Board which eventually determined that, while the state could
impose stream flow restrictions to protect the fishery, the state
had exceeded its authority by acting to enhance, rather than
merely preserve, the resource. Tacoma and PUD, on the one
hand, and the state, on the other, appealed this decision to the
state Superior Court for Thurston County, Washington.
In an unpublished opinion dated May 8, 1991, the Superior
Court reinstated the state-imposed stream flow limitations.
The court concluded that the state had the authority to set min-
imum stream flows not only to maintain a water resource, but
also to improve it. In this case, however, the court held that
the state had merely acted to protect the Dosewallips River
fishery.
Tacoma and PUD then sought and were granted direct
review in the Supreme Court of Washington. That court also
upheld the state's minimum stream flow requirements. State
of Washington v. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County, 849 P.2d
646 (1993). First, the state supreme court relied on the fact
that the Dosewallips River is classified under Washington
state water-quality standards as a Class AA stream - an
extraordinary waterway with uses that include "fish migra-
tion, rearing, spawning, and harvesting." Given the risks
posed to the fishery by low stream flows along with the
state's antidegradation policy which requires the mainte-
nance of all existing uses, the court held that the state had no
choice but to impose minimum flow conditions. In addition,
the court relied on the language of Section 401(d) of the
Clean Water Act which, in its view, permits states to condi-
tion Section 401 certification on any appropriate require-
ment of state law, not just state water-quality standards.
Therefore, the court held that the state had acted properly
under a state statute providing that rivers shall be maintained
with flows necessary to preserve fish and environmental
values.
The Supreme Court of Washington also rejected the argu-
ment of Tacoma and PUD that the Federal Power Act pre-
empts state action aimed at setting minimum stream flows
under Section 401. The court held that Section 401 was an
independent grant of authority that supplemented the other-
wise exclusive federal scheme envisioned by the Federal
Power Act. On this issue, the court declined to follow
California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490 (1990), holding that the
minimum stream flow requirements preempted in that case
were based entirely on state law and, were not, as in this
case, authorized by federal law. Tacoma and PUD then
turned to the Supreme Court, which granted their petition
for a writ of certorari to review the decision of the
Washington Supreme Court.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The authority to establish minimum stream flows is a
matter of great importance to the hydroelectric power indus-
try. The stipulation of higher stream flows can have two
adverse consequences from the industry's point of view: (1)
reduction of the amount of water which can be diverted
resulting in less power production, or (2) the production of
power at less than optimal times.
These problems loom large because over 400 existing
facilities must be relicensed between 1993 and the year
2010. The industry would prefer to keep the issue of mini-
mum stream flow exclusively in the hands of the FERC, a
familiar agency authorized to consider the need for power
production when considering stream flow conditions.
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Section 401, however, offers state governments the most
direct and effective avenue they have to preserve fisheries that
are dependent on an adequate flow of water. Without the
authority to set minimum stream flow requirements, states, 44
of which have filed an anicus brief in support of Washington,
contend that they would be unable to enforce compliance with
a critical component of their water-quality standards - the
preservation of certain beneficial uses such as fish habitat. In
the states' view, this case is vital to preserving the integrity of
the Clean Water Act.
Under the Federal Power Act (the "FPA"), the licensing of
hydroelectric facilities is a matter completely within the juris-
diction of the FERC, unless and until Congress indicates oth-
erwise. The precise scope of state authority under Section 401
is crucial, therefore, to the resolution of this case.
The Court may initially explore whether Section 401
authority is limited to discharges of pollutants from point
sources, i.e., discharges from facilities that actually add pollu-
tants to a waterway. Many dams do not physically add pollu-
tants during their operation; rather, most water-quality prob-
lems associated with dams are more indirect, caused by
diversion or impoundment of large quantities of water.
Section 401, however, merely provides that a certificate
must be obtained for activities "which may result in any dis-
charge." According to the Clean Water Act, the term dis-
charge, when used without qualification, includes point
source discharges, suggesting that the term applies to other
sources of discharge as well. Therefore, it seems unlikely that
the Court would find that a discharge that triggers Section 401
certification authority is limited to a discharge of the point
source variety. Tacoma and PUD argue, however, that their
dam still falls outside the scope of Section 401 because the
minimum stream flow requirements do not address a dis-
charge of any type which harms the aquatic environment.
The state contends, on the other hand, that discharge must
be construed broadly to include any release or activity which
alters the chemical, physical or biological integrity of water
- a very conventional view of non-point source pollution.
Tacoma and PUD counter that there must first be some sort
of release to properly involve Section 401.
In response, both Washington and the United States, as
amicus curiae supporting the state, point out that the con-
struction of the dam, which will place materials in the river,
and the subsequent release of water over or through the dam
are discharges that require a water-quality certification.
They argue that both forms of discharge will result eventu-
ally in a reduction in stream flows in the 1.2 mile bypass
reach of the Dosewallips River, a situation which would
threaten the continued use of the river as fish habitat and
which would not have happened but for the dam. Whether
this impact is too remote from any discharge caused by the
Elkhorn Project is a question Tacoma and PUD ask the
Court to decide.
If the Elkhorn Project is found to require Section 401 cer-
tification, the Court will have to address the scope of condi-
tions that the state may properly append to such a certificate.
Under Section 401(d), the state may set forth any limitations
that are necessary to assure compliance with appropriate
state requirements, which would naturally include state
water-quality standards.
Tacoma and PUD, however, insist that the only aspect of
a water-quality standard that is operable here is the scientif-
ic and technical criteria that set objective limits for fecal col-
iform bacteria, dissolved oxygen, and so on, limits that are
crafted to protect the designated uses of this Class AA
stream. Since none of the water-quality criteria refer to
stream flow, they conclude that the state clearly acted
beyond its scope of authority under Section 401(d).
The designated uses of a waterway advanced by the state,
on the other hand, certainly are an integral aspect of a water-
quality standard. They represent the aquatic values, such as
fish habitat, which serve to justify the establishment of
water-quality criteria in the first place.
The Environmental Protection Agency, moreover,
requires states to have an antidegradation policy as part of
their water-quality programs. Washington's antidegradation
provision, in turn, is aimed at protecting and maintaining
existing stream uses. Thus, Washington argues that it had a
legal duty, regardless of the specific scientific criteria that
had been established, to set minimum stream flow require-
ments in order to protect the existing populations of salmon
and trout in the Dosewallips River.
Finally, the Court may come to grips with the preemption
argument pressed by Tacoma and PUD. How can the FERC
have effective control over hydroelectric generation when
state agencies, largely unconcerned with the production of
power, are busy establishing stream flows for the purpose of
environmental protection?
This preemption argument depends on making a distinc-
tion between water quality and water quantity. According to
Tacoma and PUD, the former may be a shared responsibili-
ty, but the latter is completely reserved for the FERC. The
difficulty with the distinction, however, is that the quality of
an aquatic habitat is often directly affected by water-quanti-
ty issues. Dramatically reduced flows on the bypass stretch
of the Dosewallips River, for example, will apparently dam-
age salmon and trout fisheries. On the other hand, increased
stream flows will certainly impact power generation. The
Court, consequently, may have to examine the precise rela-
tionship between the FPA and the Clean Water Act when
dealing with questions which combine water-quantity and
water-quality problems.
Then, again, the Court may not have to address the issue
of preemption at all. As the United States argues, there is no
indication that Washington's minimum stream flow require-
ments would conflict with any eventual FERC action on the
subject. Only if and when the FERC decides that a different
flow regime is required would there be a controversy ripe
for consideration, first by the FERC and then on a petition
for review in the appropriate federal court.
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Tacoma and PUD counter this contention by pointing out
that the FERC has declared already that it lacks authority to
reject or alter state-imposed conditions in a Section 401 cer-
tificate. Thus, the controversy, according to Tacoma and
PUD, is just about as ripe as it will ever be. Notwithstanding
this argument, any position that the FERC takes on state
stream flow standards could be reviewed after the FERC
makes a licensing decision in this case.
ARGUMENTS
For PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County and the City of Tacoma
(Counsel of Record: Howard E. Shapiro; Van Ness, Feldman
& Curtis, 1050 Thomas Jefferson Street, NW, Seventh Floor,
Washington, DC 20007; (202) 298-1800):
1. This case requires the construction and application of
Sections 401 and 303 of the Clean Water Act in light of the
comprehensive regulatory scheme presented by the Federal
Power Act.
2. In the case of federally-licensed hydroelectric facilities,
state water-quality certification authority under Section
401 of the Clean Water Act is limited to determining
whether discharges from the facility comply with federal-
ly-approved, water-quality standards and other limitations
enumerated in Section 401.
3. Under section 303 of the Clean Water Act, objective "crite-
ria" rather than "uses" are the fundamental regulatory
device.
4. The authority under Section 401(d) of the Clean Water Act
to condition water-quality certificates on "any other appro-
priate requirement of state law" only allows states to
impose conditions for discharges which fail to comply with
the provisions enumerated in Section 401(a).
5. The Washington Supreme Court's expansive reading of
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act would subvert the
Federal Power Act's comprehensive licensing scheme.
For the State of Washington, Department of Ecology,
Department of Fisheries, and Department of Wildlife
(Counsel of Record: Jay J. Manning, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Office of the Washington State Attorney
General. P.O. Box 40117. Olympia, WA 98504-0117; (206)
459-6158):
1. Section 401 of the Clean Water Act authorizes imposing
conditions on a water-quality certificate, including mini-
mum stream flows, whenever necessary to prevent viola-
tions of state water-quality standards.
2. Section 401 of the Clean Water Act also authorizes impos-
ing conditions on a water-quality certificate to ensure com-
pliance with "other appropriate requirements of state law."
3. The Elkhom Project will result in discharges causing water
pollution and, without state-imposed minimum stream
flow requirements, these discharges will violate state
water-quality standards.
4. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's licensing
authority under the Federal Power Act does not affect state
authority under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act to pro-
tect state water-quality standards.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County and the City
of Tacoma
Joint brief of the American Forest & Paper Association,
American Public Power Association, Edison Electric
Institute, and National Hydropower Association (Counsel of
Record: John R. Molm; Troutman Sanders, NationsBank
Plaza, 600 Peachtree Street, NE, Suite 5200, Atlanta, GA
30308-22 16; (404) 885-3000);
Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation (Counsel of Record:
Edward Berlin; Swidler & Berlin, 3000 K Street. NW, Suite
300, Washington, DC 20007; (202) 424-7500);
Northwest Hydroelectric Association (Counsel of Record:
Richard M. Glick; Davis Wright Tremaine, 2300 First
Interstate Tower, 1300 SW Fifth Avenue, Portland, OR
97201; (503) 241-2300);
Pacific Northwest Utilities (Counsel of Record: Jay T.
Waldron; Schwabe, Williamson & Wyatt, Pacwest Center,
1211 SW Fifth Avenue, Suite 1600-1950, Portland, OR
97204; (503) 222-9981);
Western Urban Water Coalition (Counsel of Record:
Benjamin S. Sharp; Perkins Coie, 607 14th Street, NW, Suite
800, Washington, DC 20005-2011; (202) 628-6600).
In Support of the State of Washington, Department of
Ecology, Department of Fisheries, and Department of
Wildlife
Joint brief of American Rivers and 17 other environmental
and outdoor organizations (Counsel of Record: Paul M.
Smith; Farr, Smith & Taranto, 2445 M Street, NW,
Washington, DC 20037; (202) 775-0184);
The United States (Counsel of Record: Drew S. Days, III,
Solicitor General. Department of Justice. Washington, DC
20530; (202) 514-22170)
Joint brief of the State of Vermont and 43 other states
(Counsel of Record: Kathleen Liston Morrison, Assistant
Attorney General for the State of New York, The Capitol,
Albany, NY 12224; (518) 474-4819).
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